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Remove unused SSLv3 from ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported().
From Markus Uhlin <markus.uhlin at bredband dot net> ok beck@ bcooK@
This commit is contained in:
jsing
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commit
492da2984d
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.12 2016/03/20 16:50:29 krw Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: s3_cbc.c,v 1.13 2016/11/06 17:21:04 jsing Exp $ */
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/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2012 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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@ -349,7 +349,7 @@ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
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}
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}
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/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS
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/* ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded TLS
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* record.
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*
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* ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function.
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@ -362,7 +362,6 @@ ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
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* once the padding has been removed.
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* data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole
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* record, including padding.
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* is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS.
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*
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* On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding
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* functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain
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@ -373,7 +372,7 @@ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
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size_t* md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13],
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
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size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret,
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unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3)
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unsigned mac_secret_length)
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{
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union { double align;
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unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)];
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@ -381,7 +380,7 @@ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
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void (*md_final_raw)(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out);
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void (*md_transform)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block);
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unsigned md_size, md_block_size = 64;
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unsigned sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks,
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unsigned header_length, variance_blocks,
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len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks,
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num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b;
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unsigned int bits; /* at most 18 bits */
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@ -407,7 +406,6 @@ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
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md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw;
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md_transform = (void(*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block)) MD5_Transform;
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md_size = 16;
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sslv3_pad_length = 48;
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length_is_big_endian = 0;
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break;
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case NID_sha1:
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@ -459,33 +457,20 @@ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
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OPENSSL_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
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header_length = 13;
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if (is_sslv3) {
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header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length +
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8 /* sequence number */ +
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1 /* record type */ +
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2 /* record length */;
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}
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/* variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to
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* calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the
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* padding value.
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*
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* In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of the plaintext
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* varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively assume that
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* the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes of hash
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* termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final block, we
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* say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding.
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*
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* TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not
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* required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final six blocks
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* can vary based on the padding.
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*
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* Later in the function, if the message is short and there obviously
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* cannot be this many blocks then variance_blocks can be reduced. */
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variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : 6;
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variance_blocks = 6;
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/* From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13
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* bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes
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* (SSLv3) */
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* bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) */
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len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length;
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/* max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, including
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* |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */
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@ -515,30 +500,23 @@ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
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* length, in bits. */
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index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size;
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/* bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash
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* block for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of
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* SSLv3. */
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* block for the masked HMAC key. */
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/* For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need
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* at least two because the header is larger than a single block. */
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if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) {
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if (num_blocks > variance_blocks) {
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num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks;
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k = md_block_size*num_starting_blocks;
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}
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bits = 8*mac_end_offset;
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if (!is_sslv3) {
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/* Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and
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* secret bytes are included in |header| because they take more
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* than a single block. */
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bits += 8*md_block_size;
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memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
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OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
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memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
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for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
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hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
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/* Compute the initial HMAC block. */
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bits += 8*md_block_size;
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memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size);
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OPENSSL_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad));
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memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
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for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
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hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36;
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md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
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}
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md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad);
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if (length_is_big_endian) {
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memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4);
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@ -555,26 +533,12 @@ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
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}
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if (k > 0) {
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if (is_sslv3) {
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/* The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block.
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* overhang is the number of bytes beyond a single
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* block that the header consumes: either 7 bytes
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* (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). */
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unsigned overhang = header_length - md_block_size;
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md_transform(md_state.c, header);
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memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang);
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memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang);
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md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
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for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size - 1; i++)
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md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - overhang);
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} else {
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/* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
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memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
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memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
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md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
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for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
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md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
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}
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/* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */
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memcpy(first_block, header, 13);
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memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13);
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md_transform(md_state.c, first_block);
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for (i = 1; i < k/md_block_size; i++)
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md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size*i - 13);
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}
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memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out));
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@ -632,21 +596,14 @@ ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char* md_out,
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
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return 0;
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}
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if (is_sslv3) {
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/* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */
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memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
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} else {
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/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
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for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
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hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
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/* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */
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for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++)
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hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a;
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, mac_out, md_size);
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}
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EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u);
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if (md_out_size)
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*md_out_size = md_out_size_u;
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.135 2016/11/05 08:26:36 jsing Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: ssl_locl.h,v 1.136 2016/11/06 17:21:04 jsing Exp $ */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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@ -834,7 +834,7 @@ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out,
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size_t *md_out_size, const unsigned char header[13],
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const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size,
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size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret,
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unsigned mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3);
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unsigned mac_secret_length);
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__END_HIDDEN_DECLS
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.86 2016/11/03 08:15:22 jsing Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: t1_enc.c,v 1.87 2016/11/06 17:21:04 jsing Exp $ */
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/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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@ -1242,8 +1242,7 @@ tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send)
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md, &md_size, header, rec->input,
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rec->length + md_size, orig_len,
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ssl->s3->read_mac_secret,
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ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size,
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0 /* not SSLv3 */))
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ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size))
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return -1;
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} else {
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EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header));
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